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The growth of the private equity industry has spurred concerns about its potential impact on the economy
more generally. This analysis looks across nations and industries to assess the impact of private equity
on industry performance. Industries where PE funds have invested in the past five years have grown
more quickly in terms of productivity and employment. There are few significant differences between
industries with limited and high private equity activity. It is hard to find support for claims that economic
activity in industries with private equity backing is more exposed to aggregate shocks. The results
using lagged private equity investments suggest that the results are not driven by reverse causality.
These patterns are not driven solely by common law nations such as the United Kingdom and United































1.  INTRODUCTION 
In response to the global financial crisis that began in 2007, governments worldwide are 
rethinking their approach to regulating financial institutions. Among the financial institutions 
that have fallen under the gaze of regulators have been private equity (PE) funds (see, for 
instance, European Commission [2009]). There are many open questions regarding the economic 
impact of PE funds, many of which cannot be definitively answered until the aftermath of the 
buyout boom of the mid-2000s can be fully assessed.  
This paper addresses one of these open questions, by examining the impact of PE 
investments across 20 industries in 26 major nations between 1991 and 2007. We focus on 
whether PE investments in an industry affect aggregate growth and cyclicality. In particular, we 
look at the relationship between the presence of PE investments and the growth rates of 
productivity, employment and capital formation. For our productivity and employment measures, 
we find that PE investments are associated with faster growth. One natural concern is that this 
growth may have come at the expense of greater cyclicality in the industry, which would 
translate into greater risks for investors and stakeholders. Thus, we also examine whether 
economic fluctuations are exacerbated by the presence of PE investments, but we find little 
evidence that this is the case. 
Throughout our analysis we measure the growth rate in a particular industry relative to 
the average growth rate across countries in the same year. In addition, we use country and 
industry fixed effects, so that the impact of PE activity is measured relative to the average 
performance in a given country, industry, and year. For instance, if the Swedish steel industry 





two countries performs better or worse over time relative to the average performance of the steel 
industry across all countries in our sample, and whether the variations in performance over the 
industry cycles are more or less dramatic. 
Overall, we are unable to find evidence supporting the detrimental effects of PE 
investments on industries: 
•  Industries where PE funds have been active in the past five years grow more rapidly than 
other sectors, whether measured using total production, value added, or employment. In 
industries with PE investments, there are few significant differences between industries 
with a low and high level of PE activity. 
•  Activity in industries with PE backing appears to be no more volatile in the face of 
industry cycles than in other industries, and sometimes less so. The reduced volatility is 
particularly apparent in employment.  
•  These patterns continue to hold when we focus on the impact of private equity in 
continental Europe, where concerns about these investments have been most often 
expressed. 
•  We believe it is unlikely that these results are driven by reverse causality, i.e. PE funds 
selecting to invest in industries that are growing faster and/or are less volatile. The results 
are essentially unchanged if we only consider the impact of PE investments made 
between five and two years earlier on industry performance. 
It is important to note that there are a number of limitations to this analysis. First, the 
question of economic growth and volatility is only one of many questions that regulators must 





with the question of reverse causality in subsequent versions of the study. Finally, it is still too 
early to assess the consequences of the economic conditions in 2008 and 2009, a period where 
the decrease of investment and absolute volume of distressed private equity-backed assets was 
far greater than in earlier cycles. 
The plan of this study is as follows: In the second section, we develop the hypotheses to 
be tested. The third section describes the construction of the dataset and the results are presented 
in Section 4. The final section concludes. 
2.  INDUSTRY PERFORMANCE AND PRIVATE EQUITY 
There are several alternative perspectives that can be offered as to how PE investments 
can affect the prospects of an industry. In this section, we begin by reviewing the suggestions 
about changes regarding overall performance; we then turn to hypotheses regarding the 
interaction between economic cycles and PE investments. 
A.  The impact of PE investments on industry performance 
Our initial examination focuses on the performance of industries where PE funds have 
been active relative to industries where these investors have not been active.  
A central hypothesis since Jensen [1989] has been that private equity has the ability to 
improve the operations of firms. By closely monitoring managers, restricting free cash flow 
through the use of leverage and incentivizing managers with equity, it is argued, private equity-
backed firms are able to improve operations in the firms they back. In this article, Jensen 





may also increase competitive pressure and force competitors to improve their own operations. 
John et al. [1992] present supporting empirical evidence that the threat of takeover serves as a 
spur for firms to voluntarily undertake restructurings.  
The claim that private equity-backed firms have improved operations has been supported 
by a number of empirical studies, which focus on the effects on the individual private equity-
backed companies. Kaplan [1989] examines changes in accounting performance for 76 large 
management buyouts of public companies between 1980 and 1986. He shows that in the three 
years after the transaction operating income, cash flow and market value all increase. He argues 
that these increases reflect the impact of improved incentives rather than layoffs. (Looking at 
more recent deals on US public-to-private transactions, however, Guo et al. [2009] find only 
weak evidence that gains in operating performance of bought-out firms exceed those of their 
peers.)  Muscarella and Vetsuypens [1990] examine 72 “reverse LBOs” (RLBOs), that is, 
companies taken private which went public once again. These firms experienced a dramatic 
increase in profitability, which they argue is a reflection of cost reductions. 
More recent studies have used large samples and a variety of performance measures to 
more directly assess whether private equity makes a difference in the management of the firms in 
which they invest. Bloom et al. [2009] survey over 4,000 firms in Asia, Europe and the US to 
assess their management practices. They show that private equity-backed firms are on average 
the best-managed ownership group in the sample, though they cannot rule out the possibility 
these firms were better managed before the PE transaction. Davis et al. [2009] compare all US-





                                                     
similar establishments that did not receive PE investments.
1 They show that private equity-
backed firms experienced a substantial productivity growth advantage (about two percentage 
points) in the two years following the transaction. About two-thirds of this differential is due to 
improved productivity among continuing establishments of the firms. Cao and Lerner [2009] 
examine the three- and five-year stock performance of 496 RLBOs between 1980 and 2002. 
RLBOs appear to consistently outperform other IPOs and the stock market as a whole. Large 
RLBOs that are backed by PE firms with more capital under management perform better, while 
quick flips – when PE firms sell off an investment soon after acquisition – underperform. 
These findings might suggest that we would see superior performance for PE firms, 
regardless of the economic conditions. Moreover, if PE firms represent a significant fraction of 
the activity in certain industries (and tabulations in several countries, including the US and UK, 
suggest that this is the case), there may also be a positive effect at the industry level. 
Investigating the industry level also allows us to capture the ‘contagion’ effects arising if 
improvements in bought-out firms spur their competitors to improve. This effect is not captured 
by studies focusing on the individual portfolio companies.  
While there has been little systematic evidence regarding the deleterious effects of private 
equity on firms and industries, critics have pointed to case studies that illustrate negative 
consequences of transactions. For instance, Rasmussen [2008] points to the buyout of Britain’s 
Automobile Association, which led to large-scale layoffs and service disruptions while 
generating substantial profits for the transaction’s sponsor, Permira. The Service Employees 
International Union has prepared a series of studies (for example, 2007, 2008) showing the 
 
1 Establishments are specific factories, offices, retail outlets and other distinct physical locations 





deleterious effect that excessive leverage, cost-cutting and poor managerial decisions by PE 
groups can have on firms and industries through case studies such as Hawaiian Telecom, Intelsat, 
KB Toys and TDC. These cases suggest that the impact of private equity on industries may be 
more negative than suggested by the previous studies. 
B.  The impact of economic cycles 
Numerous practitioner accounts over the years have suggested that the PE industry is 
highly cyclical, with periods of easy financing availability (often in response to the successes of 
earlier transactions) leading to an acceleration of deal volume, greater use of leverage, higher 
valuations, and ultimately more troubled investments (akin to the well-known ‘corn-hog cycle’ 
in agricultural economics). 
This pattern is corroborated in several academic studies. Axelson et al. [2009] document 
the cyclical use of leverage in buyouts. Using a sample of 1,157 transactions completed by major 
groups worldwide between 1985 and 2008, they show that the level of leverage is driven by the 
cost of debt, rather than the more industry- and firm-specific factors that affect leverage in 
publicly traded firms. The availability of leverage is also strongly associated with higher 
valuation levels. Kaplan and Stein [1993] documented that the 1980s buyout boom saw an 
increase in valuations, reliance on public debt and incentive problems (for example, parties 
cashing out at the time of transaction). Moreover, in the transactions done at the market peak, the 
outcomes were disappointing: of the 66 largest buyouts completed between 1986 and 1988, 38% 
experienced financial distress, which they define as default or an actual or attempted 
restructuring of debt obligations due to difficulties in making payments. 27% actually did default 





                                                     
other papers provide indirect supporting evidence, showing that the performance of funds is 
negatively correlated with inflows into these funds. Private equity funds raised during periods of 
high capital inflows – which are typically associated with market peaks – perform far worse than 
their peers.  
These findings corroborate the suggestions that availability of financing impacts booms 
and busts in the PE market. If firms completing buyouts at market peaks employ leverage 
excessively, we may expect industries with heavy buyout activity to experience more intense 
subsequent downturns. Moreover, the effects of this overinvestment would be exacerbated if PE 
investments drive rivals, not backed by private equity, to aggressively invest and leverage 
themselves. Chevalier [1995] shows that in regions with supermarkets receiving PE investments, 
rivals responded by adding and expanding stores. 
An alternative perspective is suggested by some recent events in the PE industry, even 
though it has not been articulated by economic theorists or explored empirically. This suggestion 
is that private equity-backed firms may do better during downturns because their investors 
constitute a concentrated shareholder base, which can continue to provide equity financing in a 
way that might be difficult to arrange for other companies during downturns. To cite two recent 
examples of ‘equity cures,’ Terra Firma made a number of investments in EMI, while Kraton 
Polymers’ equity investors (Ripplewood and CCMP) did likewise during the recent recession.
2 
This perspective would imply that private equity-backed companies may actually outperform 
their peers during downturns, as they have access to equity financing that other firms did not 
 
2 See Sabbagh (2009) and 
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1321730/000119312509171893/d10q.htm (accessed 





have. The presence of liquid PE funds as shareholders may lead to fewer failures in difficult 
economic conditions.  
A related argument, originally proposed by Jensen [1989], is that the high levels of debt 
in PE transactions force firms to respond earlier and more forcefully to negative shocks to their 
business. As a result, private equity-backed firms may be forced to adjust their operations more 
rapidly at the beginning of an industry downturn, enabling them to better weather a recession. 
Even if some private equity-backed firms eventually end up in financial distress, their underlying 
operations may thus be in better shape than their peers. This facilitates an efficient restructuring 
of their capital structure and lowers the deadweight costs on the economy. Consistent with this 
argument, Andrade and Kaplan [1998] study 31 distressed leveraged buyouts from the 1980s that 
subsequently became financially distressed, and found that the value of the firms post-distress 
was slightly higher than the value before the buyout, suggesting that even the leveraged buyouts 
that were hit most severely by adverse shocks added some economic value.  
Finally, the structural differences between PE funds and other financial institutions may 
make them less susceptible to industry shocks. A major source of concern for financial 
institutions is the so-called ‘run on the bank’ phenomenon. Runs occur when holders of short-
term liabilities, for example, depositors or repo counterparties, simultaneously refuse to provide 
additional financing and demand their money back. Other versions of this phenomenon arise 
when companies simultaneously draw down lines of credit, hedge fund investors simultaneously 
ask for redemptions of their investments, or a freeze in the market for commercial paper prevents 
structured investment vehicles (SIVs) from rolling over short-term commercial paper. It is 





typically prevented from borrowing themselves, and the funds’ only claimants are their limited 
partners (LPs), which are typically bound by 10-year lock-up agreements. Hence, the funds have 
no short-term creditors that can run. By way of contrast, extensive loans are provided to the 
individual portfolio companies. However, these loans are typically made by a concentrated set of 
lenders, and are without recourse to other portfolio companies or the fund generally. Hence, an 
individual creditor’s ability to be repaid is largely unaffected by the actions of other creditors, 
mitigating the incentive to run.  
3.  DATA SOURCES AND SAMPLE CONSTRUCTION 
To analyze how PE investments affect industries, we combine two datasets, one 
containing information about PE investments compiled by Capital IQ, and another with industry 
activity and performance across the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) member countries included in the OECD’s Structural Analysis Database (STAN). 
PE investment sample: We use the Capital IQ database to construct a base sample of PE 
transactions. The base sample contains all private placements and M&A transactions in Capital 
IQ where the list of acquirers includes (at least) one investment firm that has a reported 
investment interest in one of the following stages: Seed/startup, Early venture, Emerging growth, 
Growth capital, Bridge, Turnaround, Middle market, Mature, Buyout, Mid-venture, Late venture, 
Industry consolidation, Mezzanine/subdebt, Incubation, Recapitalization, or PIPES.  
From the base sample, we select all M&A transactions classified as ‘leveraged buyout,’ 
‘management buyout,’ or ‘going private’ that were announced between January 1986 and 





STAN database. We exclude transactions that were announced but not yet completed as well as 
transactions that did not involve a financial investor (for example, a buyout led and executed by 
the management team itself was excluded). 
This results in a sample of about 14,300 transactions, involving 13,100 distinct firms. 
Since we only have information about the deal size for 50% of our transactions (though more of 
the larger transactions), we impute missing deal sizes by constructing fitted values from a 
regression of deal size on fixed effects for country, investment year and target industry. Using 
the imputed transaction sizes, we generate aggregate country-year-industry measures of PE 
volume in the form of summed deal sizes. 
 Industry  data:  The STAN database provides industry data across OECD countries 
compiled from national statistics offices. It contains economic information at the country, year 
and industry level. Thus, a typical observation would be the German transport equipment 
industry in 1999. STAN includes measures of productivity, employment and capital formation, 
as described in Table 1. Throughout this paper, we focus on the following measures of industry 
activity: 
•  Production (gross output), the value of goods and/or services produced in a year, whether 
sold or stocked, in current prices. 
•  Value added represents the industry’s contribution to national GDP, i.e. output net of 
materials purchased. While the methodology for constructing this measure differs across 
nations, our focus here is on differences across time, which should reduce the effect of 





•  Labor costs, which comprise wages and salaries of employees paid by producers as well 
as supplements such as contributions to social security, private pensions, health 
insurance, life insurance and similar schemes. 
•  Number of employees, which is the traditional measure of employment, excluding self-
employed and unpaid family members working in the business. 
•  Gross capital formation is acquisitions, less disposals, of new tangible assets, as well as 
such intangible assets as mineral exploration and computer software. This variable is the 
closest aggregate to capital expenditures. The two capital stock measures are indicators of 
the value of all capital equipment held. The gross stock measure does not factor in 
depreciation, while the net stock does reflect write-downs. 
•  Consumption of fixed capital measures the reduction in the value of fixed assets used in 
production resulting from physical deterioration or normal obsolescence. 
Mapping Capital IQ and STAN industries: Industries in the STAN database are classified 
by the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) code. To link these data to the 
industry-aggregated PE activity, we matched the ISIC codes with Capital IQ’s industry 
classifications. We used the existing mapping from Capital IQ industry classification into SIC 
codes, and then used the existing matching between SIC and ISIC industries. The mapping of 
Capital IQ industry classifications to SIC codes includes only matches for the most detailed 
levels of the Capital IQ classifications. This poses a problem for more aggregated industries for 
which Capital IQ does not provide a match to a SIC and ultimately to ISIC. When the Capital IQ 
target industry is at a more aggregated industry level, we mapped all four-digit SIC codes that 
belong to the sub-categories of the industry classification of Capital IQ. In these cases, we had 





the four-digit SICs corresponded to the same ISIC industry classification, creating a one-to-one 
mapping. In cases where the four-digit SIC codes corresponded to different industries in the ISIC 
scheme, we considered the particular deals and selected the most suitable industry. In 390 
transactions, we were not able to determine with certainty the appropriate match in ISIC, and 
those transactions were dropped, leaving us with 13,910 PE transactions with ISIC 
classifications. Finally, we grouped ISIC sub-industries to balance PE activity across industries. 
Table 2 presents the distribution of deals across industries.  
This results in a sample of 11,135 country-industry-year observations during the years 
1986 to 2007. For each country, industry and year, we measure PE activity as the volume of PE 
deals occurring in this country and industry during the previous five years. In particular, an 
observation is a PE industry if it had at least one PE investment in one of those five years. (This 
definition was motivated by holding periods reported by Strömberg [2008]).  With this 
definition, we can only compare activity during 1991 to 2007, leaving us with 8,596 country-
industry-year observations.  
Tables 2, 3 and 4 present the distribution of deals across industries, years and countries. 
In each table, we first present the number of observations (an observation is a country-industry-
year pair) and the number of those that were PE industries, as defined above. We then present 
the number of deals, transaction volume and the transaction volume including the imputed sizes 
of deals with missing information. 





                                                     
•  The heavy representation of buyouts as a share of economic activity in traditional 
industries, such as ‘Textiles, textile products, leather,’ ‘Machinery and equipment,’ ‘Pulp, 
paper, paper products, printing,’ ‘Electrical and optical equipment,’ and ‘Chemical, 
rubber, plastics and fuel products’. 
•  The acceleration in buyout activity, first modestly during the late 1980s and then 
especially in the mid-2000s. 
•  The greater level of activity in a handful of traditional hubs for PE funds, including the 
United States, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
3  
 In Table 5, we compare the changes in the industry measures over time for PE and non-
PE industries. The PE industries grow more quickly in terms of output and value added, as well 
in terms of employment. But for gross fixed capital formation, the PE industries have a slower 
growth rate. 
4.  ANALYSIS 
A.  Industry performance 
We begin by examining the relationship between various industry characteristics and the 
role of private equity in the industry. In each case, we use the industry-country-year as an 
observation, and the explanatory variable is the relative growth rate along a given dimension (for 
example, employment). This adjusted rate is computed by subtracting the growth rate 
experienced in that industry, country and year from the average growth rate across countries in 
 
3 The level of transactions is extremely high in Luxembourg, due to the tendency of many firms 
to domicile there for tax reasons, even though the bulk of their operations are elsewhere. As a 





that same industry and year. Demeaning the growth rate in this way is largely equivalent to 
including year-industry fixed effects, but it allows for an easier interpretation of the estimated 
parameters.  
We employ several specifications. First, we look at specifications that include controls 
for each year, industry and country. For the exogenous variable, we include an indicator which 
denotes whether the industry is a PE industry or not, using the definition above. This definition 
does not use the imputed deal values, since it only depends on the presence of PE deals. Second, 
we use two indicators to capture whether an industry is a low or high PE industry. A low PE 
industry (PE Low) is a PE industry where the fraction of total imputed PE investments divided 
by total production (both normalized to 2008 USD) is smaller than the median (conditional on 
having a non-zero level of PE investment). Empirically, this median is 0.61%. Correspondingly, 
a high PE industry (PE High) is one where the fraction is greater than 0.61%. We also perform 
the analysis dividing PE activity into quartiles to better measure the differential effects of 
different activity levels. Third, we include dummies that are interactions between countries and 
industries (Co-Ind FE). These controls allow us to more precisely capture national differences in 
the industry dynamics: if there is any effect from a PE investment, it is because the growth rate is 
fast during that specific period. 
The results in Table 6 indicate that industries with PE deals have significantly higher 
growth rates of production and value added. For instance, in the first regression, the coefficient 
of 0.906 implies that the total production of an average PE industry grows at an annual rate that 
is 0.906% higher than a non-PE industry. (Table 5 reports that the mean growth rate is 5.9%.) 





and differences between the four quartiles of PE activity (all reported as PEL = PEH). We find 
few differences in total production between high and low PE industries, although the 
specification using quartiles suggests that the positive effect may be particularly strong for 
industries with an intermediate level of PE activity. Value added for an industry appears to be 
increasing in the amount of PE activity, with the differences between high and low PE industries 
being statistically and economically significant. 
One concern is the direction of causality. It is possible that PE investors pick industries 
that are about to start growing and our results may reflect this industry choice rather than the 
causal effect of the investments on the industry. To mitigate this concern, we change our 
definition of the PE industry measure to only include investments during the period from two to 
five years prior to the observation, called the twice-lagged measure (the original PE measure 
included all five years prior to the observation). The results are reported in Table 7. We find that 
the results are very similar, indicating that the effect that we find is unlikely to be driven by PE 
investors entering countries and industries where they expect stronger immediate growth.  
Table 8 considers measures of employment. PE industries appear to grow significantly 
faster in terms of labor costs and the number of employees. The annual growth rate of total labor 
cost is 0.5 to 1.4 percentage points greater for PE industries, and the number of employees grows 
at an annual rate that is 0.4 to 1.0 percentage points greater. These findings are particularly 
surprising, since a common concern is that PE investors act aggressively to reduce costs with 
little concern for employees. This concern is not necessarily inconsistent with our results. 
Despite initial employment reductions at private equity-backed firms, the greater subsequent 





the industry overall. Considering the specifications with PE activity quartiles, industries with 
more PE activity appear to have more rapid growth of total labor costs, but the growth rate of the 
number of employees is fastest in industries with more moderate levels of PE activity. 
Regardless of the level of PE activity, however, the PE industries’ growth rates of labor costs and 
employment always exceed the rates for non-PE industries. 
As above, we are concerned about the direction of causality, and Table 9 repeats the 
analysis using the twice-lagged PE measure. The magnitudes in Tables 8 and 9 are largely 
similar, suggesting that the effect we find is not mainly driven by PE investors picking industries 
with expectations of immediate employment growth. 
Finally, in Table 10 we examine measures of fixed capital formation and consumption of 
fixed capital. These measures appear much more volatile than the production and employment 
measures, making it difficult to discern any relationship between PE investments and capital 
formation. 
B.  Cyclical patterns 
We next turn to analyzing how private equity relates to industry cycles. For each industry 
and year, we calculate the average growth by averaging the growth rate of the productivity and 
employment measures across countries. This measures the annual aggregate shock in these 
variables (for example, production output in the steel industry fell by 2% on average in 2002 
across the nations in our sample). We then investigate whether PE industries are more or less 
exposed to this shock by including the PE measure interacted with this average growth measure 





the interaction term is positive: during upturns, these industries grow faster and during 
downturns they decline faster. A negative coefficient indicates a lower exposure to the aggregate 
shock than industries without PE investments. Once again, we use country and industry fixed 
effects, as well as country-industry fixed effect interactions. 
In Tables 11 and 12, we examine the impact on production and employment. In the first 
table, the interaction terms are negative, which implies that PE industries are less sensitive to 
industry shocks. To interpret the coefficients, using the estimates in the first regression in Table 
12, if an industry on average experiences a 5% increase in total labor costs in a given year (the 
aggregate shock), a PE industry will experience, on average, a 5.576% increase (5% + 1.591% + 
5% x -0.203 = 5.576%). Conversely, following a 5% decrease in the wage bill, a PE industry will 
only experience, on average, a 2.394% decline (–5% + 1.591% + (–5%) x –0.203 = –2.394%). 
Hence, an aggregate swing from +5% to –5% (10% total difference) in aggregate growth rates 
translates into a swing from 5.6% to –2.4% (8% total difference) in the growth rates for PE 
industries. Both for the productivity and employment analyses, the coefficients are significantly 
negative in the simple specification and most of the coefficients in the employment analysis 
remain statistically significant when high and low PE industries are included separately. Overall, 
it appears that some PE activity translates into an industry whose employment changes less than 
average, but industries with a larger amount of PE activity may follow a growth pattern that is 
closer to that of the industry as a whole.  
C.  Geographic patterns 
One concern is that the impact of private equity is different in continental Europe than in 





UK than in most other nations, but the industry is more established, having begun in these two 
nations. We thus repeat the analysis, looking at US and UK versus Continental Europe 
(investments in Japan and South Korea are excluded from these analyses).  
We report the results in Tables 13 and 14, which repeat the base specifications reported in 
Tables 6 and 8. All the main effects remain largely unchanged for the Continental Europe 
sample. The coefficients in the US and UK sample are generally not statistically significant but 
they are not statistically different from the coefficients for the Continental Europe sample either. 
This probably reflects the small size of the US and UK sample and the resulting large standard 
errors: for productivity, value added and labor costs the coefficients are smaller than in 
Continental Europe; for total employment the coefficient is larger. 
D.  Addressing causality concerns 
One natural concern relates to the interpretation of these results. While it appears that 
private equity is associated with more rapid growth at an industry level in our analyses, it is 
natural to wonder which way the causation runs. Does the presence of private equity lead to 
better performance, or do PE investors invest where they (correctly) anticipate industries will 
grow? 
We respond to this question in several ways. First, we look at PE investments during the 
five years before the measured growth. Second, as discussed above, we have also narrowed our 
measure to only include deals in the second through fifth year prior to the investment. If our 





In subsequent versions of this paper, we will also attempt to address this concern using an 
instrumental variables technique. To identify exogenous variation, we may use the size of the 
private pension pool in the nation and year, expressed as a percentage of GDP. This is similar in 
spirit to other papers in the venture capital literature, such as Kortum and Lerner [2000] and 
Mollica and Zingales [2007]. In the nations with larger pension pools, domestic PE funds are 
more likely to raise capital and invest it locally. This is an attractive instrumental variable, 
because pension policy is typically driven by broader socio-economic considerations, and not by 
the relative health of the local PE industry. 
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
The growth of the PE industry has spurred concerns about its potential impact on the 
economy more generally. In this analysis, we look across nations and industries to assess the 
impact of private equity on industry performance. 
The key results are, first, that industries where PE funds have invested in the past five 
years have grown more quickly, using a variety of measures. There are few significant 
differences between industries with limited and high PE activity. Second, it is hard to find 
support for claims that economic activity in industries with PE backing is more exposed to 
aggregate shocks. The results using lagged PE investments suggest that the results are not driven 
by reverse causality. Finally, these patterns are not driven solely by common law nations such as 
the United Kingdom and United States, but also hold in Continental Europe. 
These findings suggest a number of avenues for future research. First, it would be 





rates of layoffs, plant closings and openings, and product and process innovations. Second, it is 
important to better understand the mechanisms by which the presence of private equity-backed 
firms affects their peers. While Chevalier’s [1995] study of the supermarket industry during the 
1980s was an important first step, much more remains to be explored here. Finally, we are only 
able to look backwards in this analysis. The buyout boom of the mid 2000s was so massive, and 
the subsequent crash in activity so dramatic, that the consequences may have been substantially 
different from other economic cycles (see Kosman [2009]). The impact of the recent cycle will 
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 Table 1: Descriptions of OECD STAN industry variables 
Industry variable  Description 
Production (gross output)  Value of goods and/or services produced in a year, whether sold or stocked, 
measured at current prices 
Value added  Industry contribution to national GDP. Value added comprises labor costs, 
consumption of fixed capital, taxes less subsidies, measured at current prices 
Labor costs (compensation of employees) 
Wages and salaries of employees paid by producers as well as supplements such as 
contributions to social security, private pensions, health insurance, life insurance 
and similar schemes 
Number of employees  Persons engaged in domestic production excluding self-employed and unpaid family 
workers 
Gross fixed capital formation  
Acquisitions, less disposals, of new tangible assets (such as machinery and 
equipment, transport equipment, livestock, constructions) and new intangible assets 
(such as mineral exploration and computer software) to be used for more than one 
year, measured at current prices 
Consumption of fixed capital   Reduction in the value of fixed assets used in production resulting from physical 
deterioration, normal obsolescence or normal accidental damage 





 Table 2: Distribution of deals by industry  The sample consists of 8,596 country-industry-year observations of OECD countries between 1991 
and 2007.  Observations is the number of observations in the industry. PE industries contains the number of observations classified as PE 
industries. An industry is a PE industry if it had at least one PE investment during the previous five years. Deals is the number of deals, and Deal 




industries Deals  Deal  volume 
Imputed deal 
volume 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing  432 84  54  6.18  10.25 
Basic metals and fabricated metal products  431 234  782  77.20  130.64 
Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel products  431 223  757  116.17  169.29 
Community, social and personal services  430 216  1,162  323.37  391.99 
Construction  430 173  328  28.44 48.04 
Electrical and optical equipment  431 229  879  146.87  193.08 
Electricity, gas and water supply  431 84  109  100.90  123.29 
Financial intermediation  426 232  586  156.39  212.19 
Food products, beverages and tobacco  431 221  572  114.45  156.51 
Hotels and restaurants  426 171  454  135.58  159.36 
Machinery and equipment  431 255  1,316  135.92  219.85 
Manufacturing and recycling  431 166  394  32.70 60.15 
Mining and quarrying  429 98  157  32.87  45.73 
Other non-metallic mineral products  431 131  163  19.35 30.32 
Pulp, paper, paper products, printing, publishing  431 216  556  115.74  150.16 
Real estate, renting and business activities  426 284  2,737  372.99  522.91 
Textiles, textile products, leather  431 213  447  32.02 67.14 
Transport equipment  431 113  111  15.73 23.07 
Transport, storage and communications  430 231  595  257.11  296.96 
Wholesale and retail trade – repairs  426 279  1,725  358.60  481.98 










Table 3: Distribution of deals by year  Observations is the number of country-industry-year 
observations per year. PE industries contains the number of observations classified as PE industries. An 
industry is a PE industry if it had at least one PE investment during the previous five years. Deals is the 
number of deals, and Deal volume is the combined size of the deals (normalized to 2008 US$ billions). 
Imputed deal volume imputes the deal size for deals with missing size information. 
Year Observations 
PE 
industries Deals Deal  volume
Imputed deal 
volume 
1986   n/a  n/a  95  19.56  27.15 
1987  n/a n/a 109 18.51 27.43 
1988  n/a n/a 157 42.83 60.77 
1989  n/a n/a 137 59.75 68.07 
1990  n/a n/a 120 21.41 32.47 
1991  456 116  158  13.29  21.88 
1992  469 139  178  15.73  26.80 
1993  509 177  197  16.44  29.61 
1994  516 191  262  15.57  25.68 
1995  520 202  347  35.05  49.86 
1996  520 204  431  43.53  57.30 
1997  520 206  655  55.41  86.12 
1998  520 202  871  94.46 144.40 
1999  520 217  824  86.41 131.17 
2000  520 228  780 105.44 138.76 
2001  520 251  687  80.83 102.62 
2002  520 269  722  93.28 122.11 
2003  520 276  945 145.73 178.78 
2004  520 293  1,217 203.73 278.14 
2005  520 293  1,428 258.58 368.21 
2006  520 316  1,788 404.54 552.20 
2007  406 273  1,776 748.42 963.42 





Table 4: Distribution of deals by country The sample consists of 8,596 country-industry-year 
observations of OECD countries between 1991 and 2007. Observations is the number of observations in 
each country. PE industries contains the number of observations classified as PE industries. An industry 
is a PE industry if it had at least one PE investment during the previous five years. Deals is the number of 
deals, and Deal volume is the combined size of the deals (normalized to 2008 US$ billions). Imputed deal 
volume imputes the size for deals with missing size information. 
Country Observations  PE  industries Deals Deal  volume 
Imputed deal 
volume 
Australia  320  125  124 14.67 18.66 
Austria  340  77  54 1.79 3.98 
Belgium  340  129  118 13.00 22.70 
Canada  340 218 294  99.48 117.61 
Czech  Republic  300  158  37 5.06 5.89 
Denmark 340  94  143  9.79  17.33 
Finland 340  161  192  7.66  16.06 
France    339 274  1,294 122.34 179.05 
Germany  340 220 598 109.79 187.06 
Greece  324  30 7 4.45 6.14 
Hungary  320  142  18 1.15 3.39 
Ireland  340  104 49 19.09 21.07 
Israel  339 6 4 0.00 0.01 
Italy  340  210  345 42.83 58.94 
Japan  328 70 73 20.79 26.71 
Netherlands  340 204 323  85.15 125.95 
Norway  340  73  71 5.00 9.53 
Poland    286  171  41 2.34 2.61 
Portugal    320  63  27 0.25 0.33 
Slovakia  300  111  13 0.18 0.93 
South  Korea  340  47  20 4.81 4.81 
Spain  320  171  222 38.98 42.86 
Sweden  340  186  271 43.33 58.31 
Switzerland  340  158  111 17.66 31.46 
United  Kingdom  340 318  2,312 390.44 441.10 
United  States  340  333 7,123 1,518.47 2,090.46 





Table 5: Industry growth variables  The sample consists of 8,596 country-industry-year observations of OECD countries between 1991 and 
2007. An industry is considered as a PE industry if it had at least a single PE deal in the previous five years. P-value provides the p-value of a test 
of equality of the means of PE and non-PE industries. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
  All industries    PE industries    Non-PE industries   
 Observations Average 
growth 
Std. 
dev.   Observations Average 
growth 
Std. 
dev.   Observations Average 
growth 
Std. 
dev.   P-value
Production (gross output)   7,351  5.9  8.8  3,318  6.2  8.5  4,033  5.7  9.1  0.03 
Value  added    8,238 5.6  10.2  3,635 5.8 9.8  4,603 5.5  10.5  0.17 
Labor costs (compensation of 
employees)  7,831  5.1  7.5 3,398  5.3  7.4 4,433  5.0  7.6  0.18 
Number of employees   6,269  0.0  5.0  2,862  0.3  4.1  3,407  -0.3  5.6  0.00 
Gross fixed capital formation   7,004  7.1  76.6  3,223  6.8  27.6  3,781  7.5  101.1  0.67 







Table 6: PE activity and growth rate of productivity  The table contains OLS regression coefficients. An observation is a country-industry-year 
pair. The endogenous variable is the deviation of the annual growth rate of production or value added (as defined by OECD) relative to the average 
rate in the same industry and year. The exogenous variables are an indicator for positive PE activity over the previous five years at the country-
industry level (PE), indicators for whether the measured PE activity is below or above the median activity level (PE Low and PE High), and 
indicators for quartiles. The omitted base category is no PE activity over the previous five years. The regressions contain industry, country, and 
country-industry (Co-Ind) fixed effects as indicated. Standard errors are calculated with clustering at the country-year level and presented in 
parenthesis. PEL = PEH contains the significance level of a Wald test of equality of the PE Low and PE High coefficients or the quartile 
coefficients. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 
















Value added Value added Value added Value added Value added
PE  0.906***       1.117***      
  (0.241)       (0.270)      
PE Low    0.886***  1.033***        0.924***  0.893***     
   (0.243)  (0.300)        (0.279)  (0.338)     
PE High    0.932***  1.452***        1.377***  1.755***     
   (0.288)  (0.374)        (0.327)  (0.414)     
PE Q1        0.551**  0.850**        0.660**  0.731** 
       (0.265)  (0.330)        (0.298)  (0.361) 
PE Q2        1.224***  1.218***        1.188***  1.044*** 
       (0.293)  (0.345)        (0.338)  (0.396) 
PE Q3        1.131***  1.549***        1.413***  1.702*** 
       (0.291)  (0.364)        (0.342)  (0.424) 
PE  Q4        0.786** 1.393***       1.398***  1.884*** 
       (0.358)  (0.466)        (0.392)  (0.498) 
Industry  FE  Yes Yes  No Yes  No Yes Yes  No Yes  No 
Country  FE  Yes Yes  No Yes  No Yes Yes  No Yes  No 
Co-Ind  FE  No  No Yes  No Yes  No  No Yes  No Yes 
PEL = PEH   0.832  0.129  0.037**  0.206   0.093*  0.009***  0.087*  0.056* 
Observations  6,976 6,976 6,976 6,976 6,976 7,013 7,013 7,013 7,013 7,013 





Table 7: Twice-lagged PE activity and growth rate of productivity  The table contains OLS regression coefficients. An observation is a 
country-industry-year pair. The endogenous variable is the deviation of the annual growth rate of production or value added (as defined by OECD) 
relative to the average rate in the same industry and year. The exogenous variables are an indicator for positive PE activity over the previous four 
years -2 to -5, i.e. not including the year previous to the year where the growth in the endogenous variable is measured (PE), indicators for whether 
the measured PE activity is below or above the median activity level (PE Low and PE High) and indicators for quartiles. The omitted base 
category is no PE activity. The regressions contain industry, country and country-industry (Co-Ind) fixed effects as indicated. Standard errors are 
calculated with clustering at the country-year level and presented in parenthesis. PEL = PEH contains the significance level of a Wald test of 
equality of the PE Low and PE High coefficients or the quartile coefficients. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by 
***, ** and *, respectively. 
















Value added Value added Value added Value added Value added
PE  0.869***       1.140***      
  (0.239)       (0.269)      
PE Low    0.875***  0.982***        0.943***  0.906***     
   (0.241)  (0.285)        (0.280)  (0.324)     
PE High    0.862***  1.278***        1.395***  1.710***     
   (0.287)  (0.363)        (0.320)  (0.393)     
PE Q1        0.542**  0.775**        0.633**  0.647* 
       (0.267)  (0.308)        (0.299)  (0.332) 
PE Q2        1.210***  1.187***        1.251***  1.148*** 
       (0.282)  (0.328)        (0.343)  (0.395) 
PE Q3        1.039***  1.298***        1.437***  1.619*** 
       (0.304)  (0.369)        (0.343)  (0.403) 
PE  Q4        0.736** 1.324***       1.414***  1.912*** 
       (0.339)  (0.436)        (0.389)  (0.483) 
Industry  FE  Yes Yes  No Yes  No Yes Yes  No Yes  No 
Country  FE  Yes Yes  No Yes  No Yes Yes  No Yes  No 
Co-Ind  FE  No  No Yes  No Yes  No  No Yes  No Yes 
PEL = PEH   0.952  0.284  0.048**  0.418   0.079*  0.012**  0.057*  0.031** 
Observations  6,976 6,976 6,976 6,976 6,976 7,013 7,013 7,013 7,013 7,013 





Table 8: PE activity and growth rate of employment  The table contains OLS regression coefficients. An observation is a country-industry-year 
pair. The endogenous variable is the deviation of the annual growth rate of labor costs or total employment (as defined by OECD) relative to the 
average rate in the same industry and year. The exogenous variables are an indicator for positive PE activity over the previous five years at the 
country-industry level (PE), indicators for whether the measured PE activity is below or above the median activity level (PE Low and PE High) 
and indicators for quartiles. The omitted base category is no PE activity over the previous five years. The regressions contain industry, country and 
country-industry (Co-Ind) fixed effects as indicated. Standard errors are calculated with clustering at the country-year level and presented in 
parenthesis. PEL = PEH contains the significance level of a Wald test of equality of the PE Low and PE High coefficients or the quartile 
coefficients. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 






































PE  0.684***       0.587***         
 (0.253)       (0.161)         
PE Low    0.540**  0.587*        0.710***  0.840***     
   (0.262)  (0.320)        (0.158)  (0.197)     
PE  High    0.887***  1.203***       0.422**  0.646**    
   (0.281)  (0.370)        (0.195)  (0.258)     
PE Q1        0.071  0.112        0.549***  0.679*** 
       (0.290)  (0.346)        (0.167)  (0.216) 
PE Q2        1.017***  1.054***        0.876***  1.018*** 
       (0.286)  (0.347)        (0.184)  (0.215) 
PE Q3        0.907***  1.185***        0.661***  0.906*** 
       (0.294)  (0.379)        (0.207)  (0.258) 
PE Q4        0.984***  1.410***        0.194  0.368 
       (0.310)  (0.411)        (0.218)  (0.296) 
Industry FE  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Country FE  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Co-Ind FE  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
PEL = PEH   0.075*  0.010** 0.001***  0.002***   0.039**  0.272  0.001***  0.002*** 
Observations  6,743 6,743 6,743 6,743 6,743  6,768  6,768  6,768  6,768  6,768 





Table 9: Twice-lagged PE activity and growth rate of employment  The table contains OLS regression coefficients. An observation is a 
country-industry-year pair. The endogenous variable is the deviation of the annual growth rate of labor costs or total employment (as defined by 
OECD) relative to the average rate in the same industry and year. The exogenous variables are an indicator for positive PE activity over the 
previous four years -2 to -5, i.e. not including the year previous to the year where the growth in the endogenous variable is measured (PE), 
indicators for whether the measured PE activity is below or above the median activity level (PE Low and PE High) and indicators for quartiles. 
The omitted base category is no PE activity. The regressions contain industry, country and country-industry (Co-Ind) fixed effects as indicated. 
Standard errors are calculated with clustering at the country-year level and presented in parenthesis. PEL = PEH contains the significance level of a 
Wald test of equality of the PE Low and PE High coefficients or the quartile coefficients. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are 
indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively. 






























PE  0.594**       0.528***      
 (0.239)       (0.171)      
PE Low    0.426*  0.423        0.677*** 0.743***    
   (0.245)  (0.292)        (0.169) (0.205)    
PE High    0.824***  1.085***        0.318 0.495*   
   (0.273)  (0.345)        (0.215) (0.283)    
PE Q1        -0.023  -0.052        0.574*** 0.690*** 
       (0.275)  (0.314)        (0.181) (0.209) 
PE Q2        0.879***  0.898***        0.799*** 0.842*** 
       (0.268)  (0.325)        (0.200) (0.244) 
PE Q3        0.947***  1.155***        0.789*** 0.964*** 
       (0.295)  (0.358)        (0.226) (0.280) 
PE  Q4        0.786** 1.167***       -0.189 -0.087 
       (0.306)  (0.398)        (0.251) (0.335) 
Industry FE  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Country FE  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Co-Ind FE  No  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
PEL = PEH    0.040**  0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001***    0.033** 0.207  0.000***  0.000*** 
Observations  6,743 6,743 6,743 6,743 6,743  5,771 5,771 5,771 5,771 5,771 





Table 10: PE activity and growth rate of capital formation  The table contains OLS regression coefficients. An observation is a country-
industry-year pair. The endogenous variable is the deviation of the annual growth rate of gross fixed capital formation or consumption of fixed 
capital (as defined by OECD) relative to the average rate in the same industry and year. The exogenous variables are an indicator for positive PE 
activity over the previous four years -2 to -5, i.e. not including the year previous to the year where the growth in the endogenous variable is 
measured (PE), indicators for whether the measured PE activity is below or above the median activity level (PE Low and PE High) and indicators 
for quartiles. The omitted base category is no PE activity. The regressions contain industry, country and country-industry (Co-Ind) fixed effects as 
indicated. Standard errors are calculated with clustering at the country-year level and presented in parenthesis. PEL = PEH contains the 
significance level of a Wald test of equality of the PE Low and PE High coefficients or the quartile coefficients. Statistical significance at the 1%, 
5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 



























PE  -0.890       0.106      
  (1.881)       (0.291)      
PE Low    -0.697  -1.145      -0.113  0.092    
   (1.601)  (1.352)      (0.316)  (0.362)    
PE High    -1.145  -0.372      0.366  0.401    
   (2.412)  (1.501)      (0.332)  (0.375)    
PE  Q1      0.123 0.240        -0.567  -0.474 
      (1.401) (1.283)        (0.357)  (0.380) 
PE  Q2      -1.458 -2.307        0.347  0.641 
      (2.038) (1.719)        (0.371)  (0.438) 
PE  Q3      -0.803 0.192        0.196  0.141 
      (2.458) (1.626)        (0.454)  (0.489) 
PE  Q4      -1.691 -1.543        0.615**  0.841** 
      (2.628) (1.807)        (0.312)  (0.368) 
Industry  FE  Yes  Yes No  Yes No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Country  FE  Yes  Yes No  Yes No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Co-Ind  FE  No  No Yes  No Yes  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
PEL = PEH    0.733 0.533 0.694 0.226    0.096*  0.360  0.007***  0.004*** 
Observations  6,074 6,074 6,074 6,074 6,074  4,712  4,712  4,712  4,712  4,712 





Table 11: PE activity and productivity cycles  The table contains OLS regression coefficients. An observation 
is the annual growth rate of the indicated productivity measure (subtracting its average growth rate across 
countries) at the country-industry-year level. The exogenous variable PE x Avg growth contains the interaction 
between PE and the average growth rate of the endogenous variable, averaged over countries. PE is an indicator 
for positive PE activity in the country-industry during the previous five years. The variables PE Low x Avg growth 
and PE High x Avg growth are constructed similarly, where PE Low and PE High are indicators for below or 
above median PE activity. The regressions contain industry, country and country-industry (Co-Ind FE) fixed 
effects as indicated. Standard errors are calculated with clustering at the country-year level and presented in 
parenthesis. PAL = PAH contains the significance level of a Wald test of equality of the PE Low x Avg growth and 
PE High x Avg growth coefficients. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** 
and *, respectively. 

















PE x Avg 
growth 
-0.085**     -0.102*    
(0.042)     (0.058)    
PE Low x 
Avg growth 
h
 -0.124**  -0.085   -0.159*  -0.112 
 (0.057)  (0.060)   (0.088)  (0.095) 
PE High x 
Avg growth 
 -0.051  -0.021   -0.036  -0.013 
 (0.042)  (0.045)   (0.061)  (0.065) 
PE  1.357***     1.678***   
  (0.311)     (0.390)    
PE  Low   1.641*** 1.517***  1.870*** 1.568** 
   (0.374)  (0.425)   (0.539)  (0.612) 
PE  High   1.123*** 1.365***  1.549*** 1.732***
   (0.350)  (0.422)   (0.451)  (0.523) 
        
Industry  FE  Yes Yes  No Yes Yes  No 
Country  FE  Yes Yes  No Yes Yes  No 
Co x Ind FE  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
PAL = PAH   0.167  0.254   0.200  0.338 
Observations  6,976 6,976 6,976 7,013 7,013 7,013 





Table 12: PE activity and employment cycles  The table contains OLS regression coefficients. An observation 
is the annual growth rate of the indicated employment measure (subtracting its average growth rate across 
countries) at the country-industry-year level. The exogenous variable PE x Avg growth contains the interaction 
between PE and the average growth rate of the endogenous variable, averaged over countries. PE is an indicator 
for positive PE activity in the country-industry during the previous five years. The variables PE Low x Avg growth 
and PE High x Avg growth are constructed similarly, where PE Low and PE High are indicators for below or 
above median PE activity. The regressions contain industry, country and country-industry (Co-Ind FE) fixed 
effects as indicated. Standard errors are calculated with clustering at the country-year level and presented in 
parenthesis. PAL = PAH contains the significance level of a Wald test of equality of the PE Low x Avg growth and 
PE High x Avg growth coefficients. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** 
and *, respectively. 


















PE x Avg 
growth 
-0.203***     -0.098**     
(0.041)     (0.045)     
PE Low x 
Avg growth 
h
 -0.277***  -0.229***    -0.172*** -0.114**
 (0.049)  (0.055)    (0.050)  (0.054) 
PE High x 
Avg growth 
h
 -0.112**  -0.111*    -0.039  -0.036 
 (0.050)  (0.059)    (0.055)  (0.063) 
PE 1.591***      0.538***    
 (0.306)     (0.171)     
PE Low    1.910***  1.657***    0.750*** 0.792***
   (0.361)  (0.415)    (0.173)  (0.206) 
PE High    1.295***  1.517***    0.324  0.493* 
   (0.345)  (0.431)    (0.215)  (0.282) 
          
Industry FE  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No 
Country FE  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No 
Co x Ind FE  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
PAL = PAH   0.004*** 0.080*    0.016** 0.213 
Observations  6,743 6,743 6,743  5,771  5,771  5,771 





Table 13: International PE activity and productivity  The table contains OLS regression coefficients. An observation is the annual growth rate 
of the indicated productivity measure (subtracting its average growth rate across countries) at the country-industry-year level, separating US/UK 
and Continental European countries. The exogenous variables are an indicator for positive PE activity over the previous five years at the country-
industry level (PE), and indicators for whether the measured PE activity is below or above the median activity level (PE Low and PE High). The 
omitted base category is no PE activity over the previous five years. The regressions contain industry and country fixed effects as indicated. 
Standard errors are robust and presented in parenthesis. PEL = PEH contains the significance level of a Wald test of equality of the PE Low and PE 
High coefficients, and PEUS = PECON contains the significance level of a t-test of equality of the coefficients PE for US/UK and PE for Continental 
Europe. Statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 














Value addedValue addedValue added Value added
  US/UK  US/UK CON  CON US/UK  US/UK CON  CON 
PE  -0.299   0.878***  0.289   1.225***   
  (1.001)   (0.187)   (1.430)   (0.231)  
PE  Low    -0.535   0.893***   -0.208   0.951***
   (1.006)   (0.213)   (1.444)   (0.260) 
PE  High   0.050   0.861***  1.024   1.526***
   (1.069)   (0.227)   (1.499)   (0.293) 
          
Industry  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
PEL = PEH   0.257   0.892   0.049**   0.057* 
PEUS = PECON  0.245   0.245   0.473   0.473  
Observations  660  660 5,037  5,037 660  660 5,074  5,074 





Table 14: International PE activity and employment  The table contains OLS regression 
coefficients. An observation is the annual growth rate of the indicated employment measure 
(subtracting its average growth rate across countries) at the country-industry-year level, 
separating US/UK and Continental European countries. The exogenous variables are an indicator 
for positive PE activity over the previous five years at the country-industry level (PE), and 
indicators for whether the measured PE activity is below or above the median activity level (PE 
Low and PE High). The omitted base category is no PE activity over the previous five years. The 
regressions contain industry and country fixed effects as indicated. Standard errors are robust and 
presented in parenthesis. PEL = PEH contains the significance level of a Wald test of equality of 
the PE Low and PE High coefficients, and PEUS = PECON contains the significance level of a t-test 
of equality of the coefficients PE for US/UK and PE for Continental Europe. Statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are indicated by ***, ** and *, respectively. 


























 US/UK  US/UK  CON  CON  US/UK  US/UK  CON  CON 
PE -0.237    0.639***    1.736**   0.400***  
  (1.258)   (0.156)   (0.768)    (0.127)   
PE Low    -0.295    0.408**    1.965**    0.554***
   (1.239)   (0.183)    (0.800)    (0.140) 
PE High    -0.150    0.906***    1.396*    0.213 
   (1.332)   (0.186)    (0.774)    (0.160) 
             
Industry  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Country  FE  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
PEL = PEH   0.734   0.010**    0.108    0.0325**
PEUS = PECON  0.372   0.372   0.131    0.131   
Observations 660  660  4,804  4,804  660 660 4,245 4,245 
R-squared  0.058 0.058 0.266 0.267 0.144  0.148  0.082  0.082 
 